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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

HARRY L. YOUNG & SONS, INC.,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 13866

-vsTHE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH and
DENNIS ASHTON,
Defendants<

DEFENDANTS' BRIEF
DEFENDANTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff's "Statement of Facts" is substantially correct
as to the facts therein stated but Defendants wish to make the
following modifications to it.
The lease of the Kenworth tractor (R.189,Exhibit 7) must
include the finding that the registered owner of the vehicle
was at all times H.L. Young and Sons, Inc. (R.203,Exhibit 20).
Oversize permits listed H.L. Young and Sons, Inc. as registered
owner (R.195,Exhibit 13). Overweight permits listed the same
ownership (R.196,Exhibit 14). The discussions regarding the
lease of the truck took place in the offices of H.L. Young and
Sons, Inc. with one Woody Snider (R.46,47).

The repair of

truck 2150 was with the approval of Mr. Snider (R.48).
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Mr.

Snider represented himself to be a representative of Inland
Transport, Inc., (R.49),

Mr. Snider was the representative

of Intermountain Accounting Corporation and signed the Agreement to Maintain a Reserve Account (R.50,190,Exhibit 8 ) . Mr.
Snider was designated as the individual to act under the
Power of Attorney authorizing the deposit of defendant's money
to the reserve account (R.199,Exhibit 16). It was necessary
for defendant to obtain approval from Snider prior to taking
out any load for H.L. Young and Sons, Inc. (R.147).

Snider

advised as to the number of miles defendant should drive
each month (R.148).

Defendant was advised to take an over-

load or take no load at all (R.155).

Plaintiff fined defendant

$15.00 for exceeding the speed limit (R.194).

Defendant was

required to make check point calls in accordance with trip
plans (R.192,Exhibit 10; R.193,Exhibit 11) and testimony in
support thereof (R.115 to R.120).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
ASHTON WAS NOT AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR AND WAS, IN
FACT, AN EMPLOYEE OF YOUNG FOR WORKMENS COMPENSATION
PURPOSES.
In reviewing all of the evidence, it must be born in mind
that the separate corporations of Inland Transport, Inc.,
Intermountain Accounting Corp. and H.L. Young and Sons, Inc.
were at all times represented by the same individual - E.D.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Snider.

Inland Transport never established that it actually

owned by title or registration truck 2150. At all times
Young was the registered owner and its representative Snider - was at all times acting essentially for Young.
The evidence is clear that at best the separate corporations were established as paper companies to avoid at all
costs the establishment of an employment relationship with
Young by the defendant.

It seems obvious that the lease

should have run from the owner,Youftg,to the lessee,Ashton.
The assignment of revenue should have run from Young to the
accountant.

The Power of Attorney should have designated the

accounting company as the holder of the power to handle the
money.
The record seems to be very clear that there was some
reason for what was being done.

The obvious answer was to

avoid employment.
At midpoint in the evedentiary hearing the commissioner
granted a motion to dismiss as to both Inland Transport, Inc.
and Intermountain Accounting Corp. on the obvious grounds
that neither was in any position to control directly or indirectly the activities of Ashton (R.142).

The record to that

point and subsequent was very clear that Young not only had
the right to control but, in fact, exercised the same.
Defendant concurred in the dismissal.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Arthur Larson in his definitive work - The Law of
Workmens Compensation - at paragraph 44.0 writes as follows:
"44. Contractor Distinction: Right to Control Details.
44.00 The traditional test of the employer-employee
relation is the right of the employer to control
the details of the work. It is the ultimate right
of control, under the agreement with the employee,
not the overt exercise of that right, which is
decisive. If the right of control of the details
goes no farther than is necessary to ensure a
satisfactory end result, it does not establish
employment. The principal factors showing right
of control are (1) direct evidence of right or
exercise of control; (2) method of payment; (3) the
furnishing of equipment; and (4) the right to fire."
In category (1) above the record is replete with the
actual exercise of direct control ranging from pre-employment tests (R.185,Exhibit 3, R.208,Exhibit 23),to the fine
(R.194), to approval to take out a load (R.147), to the
number of miles to drive (R.148) and all of the other details
required by Snider.
In category (2) the record shows that Young agreed to
pay Ashton on a mileage basis of .33 per mile less incurred
expenses (R.144).

This method is nothing more than piece

work.
With respect to item (3) the furnishing of equipment,
the record is very clear that at all times material the
truck was not only owned but registered in the name of Young.
There is no evidence of either ownership or registration in
the name of Inland, the purported lessor.
Young's.

The equipment was
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All the trailers were registered in the nam**

of Young (R.99) and Young would be responsible for the
contents.

The I C C authority was Young's.

In the matter of item (4) the right to fire, it is
very evident that Snider had such a right as the agent of
Young.

He, in fact, exercised this right at the eventual

termination of Ashton.
Larson at section 44.20 p.648 (The Law of Workmens
Compensation) writes:
"Similarly, if the control o f i trucker'^oes nofurther than directions oh where to pick up or put down
the load, this is usually held to be a part of the
end result.
But this idea of calling 'details1 like speed and
location a part of the end result cannot be pressed
too far. The point at /Which the lihe must be drawn
is aptly stated in the Barlion case relying on the
Roth case:
The whole project involved many inter dependent details, the control of any one of which
could not be surrendered without disorganization of the whole. (Pennsylvania Railroad v.
Barlion, 172F 2d 710,711, and Pennsylvania
Railroad v. Roth, 163F 2d 161)."
The case of Bowser v Industrial Accident Commission.
182 Ore. 42, 185 P 2d 891. classified as employees log
truckers who owned their own trucks and were paid by the
quantity of logs carried.
In the Utah case of Sutton v Industrial Commission 9U
2d 339, 344 P 2d 538, the defendant contended that the
claimant was an employee of an independent contractor.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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This was rejected by the court which said in part:
"While the elements of control by the employer
and the intent of the parties are the most important
ones, none of the factors separately is controlling."
With respect to method of payment Professor Larson
states at section 44.33(b) "Payment on a completed project basis is indicative
of independent contractor status. Payment on a
piece work or commission basis is consistent with
either status....The majority of modern decisions
awarding compensation give little weight to the fact
that a trucker, cutter or loader is compensated
at so much per thousand feet of logs or lumber,
per tie, per ton of stone, per yard of gravel, or
per load mile....
Larson states further at section 44.34'-"
"When the employer furnishes valuable equipment
the relationship is almost invariably that of
employment. When the employee furnishes such
equipment, this circumstance may, if coupled with
other factors, indicate independent contractorship,
but in itself it is not necessarily fatal to a
showing of employment based on other grounds....
From this rationale it also follows that control
may be realistically inferred even when the employer
owns only a part of the equipment, if that part is
of considerable size and value. For example, it is
becomming quite common for employers to own fleets
of trailers, and to contract with owner-drivers of
tractors to haul the trailers. In cases involving
this arrangement the trailer owners have been held
to be employers, apparently on the theory stated
above, that the trailer-owner presumably would
have to reserve the right to control the way his
trailer was handled. (James v McDonald, 73 S.D.
78, 39 N.W. 2d 478; Calvert v Industrial Coram.
55 Ohio L. Abs. 407, 90 N.E. 2d 424)"
Inspite of these arguments, there is a growing
tendency to classify owner-drivers of trucks as
employees when they perform continuous service which
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-6-

in an integral part of the employer's business.11
The plaintiff1s position is that Ashton was the owner
of the tractor.

Conceding, for purposes of argument that

this is true, the record is also clear that Young owned
and controlled the trailer and contents. (R.99).

On

Professor Larson's theory, Young had the greater interest
in the equipment being used and of necessity to protect
that interest was required to exercise a great deal of
control.

As an example Young had a speed limit 5 miles

per hour less than the highway posted speed limit (R.69,
Exhibit 12).

Obviously, the speed restrictions, the

check points, the call ins, everything that Young did was
prudent and correct to assure the proper handling of
Young's equipment.
Plaintiff has cited Gallegos v. Stringham 21u 2d 139,
442 P 2d 31 and the contents thereof are clear in establishing that, in fact, an employer-employee relationship
did exist. This court pointed out the elements of control
necessary to establish the relationship.
"Defendant was told when to speed his trips and
when to back up to the traxcavator and when to drive
away, and he could not haul dirt in any other manner
than as he was told."
* * * *

If the driver of the truck failed to maintain his position in line, the foreman of Gibbons and Reed
could stop the truck from hauling."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Further the court explained:
"Because Gibbons and Reed paid ten dollars per
hour for the use of the truck, including the driver,
it could not afford to let jt,he:,driver determinethe amount of work to be done. Such a rate of pay
justified and made necessary the control of the
movement of the truck by the company."
In the light of these facts, the court concluded
that an employer-employee relationship had been demonstrated.
It is interesting to relate this to the case at bar.
The first portion deals with the details of the work markedly similar to the details described by Ashton as to
what Young required.

The second quoted section details

the right of the employer to terminate - virtually the same
right exercised by Snider as agent of Young.

And the

third dealing with compensation at a high rate which included the equipment - not substantially different than the
.33 cents per mile paid by Young.
Defendant agrees that Luker Sand and Gravel v.
Industrial Commission 82 U 188, 23 P 2d 225 and Kinder v.
Industrial Commission 106 U 448, 150 P 2d 109 are controlling cases generally in the area of the exercise of control
and the right to control.

One can quote extensively from

each and distinguish and compare all three with Gallegos
and reach an entirely different conclusion than that reached
by defendant.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT II
ASSUMING ASHTON WAS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR, ASHTON
IS NEVERTHELESS ENTITLED TO VTORKMENS COMPENSATION
BENEFITS BECAUSE HE IS IN THE SAME EMPLOYMENT AS
YOUNG AND IS A STATUTORY EMPLOYEE
For purposes of argument only and without conceding
that Ashton was not an employee, let us assume that Ashton
was an "independent contractor" as claimed by plaintiff.
Section 35-1-42 U.C.A. 1953 provides in part:
*

*

*

*

.

#

„

. .

"Where any employer procures any work to be done
wholly or in part for him by a contractor over
whose work he retains supervision or control and
such work is a part or process in the trade or business of the employer, such contractor, and all
persons employed by him, and all subcontractors
under him, and all persons employed by any such
subcontractors, shall be deemed# within the meaning
of this section, employees of such original employer*
Any person, firm or corporation engaged in the
performance of work as an independent contractor shall
be deemed an employer within the meaning of this
section* The term "independent contractor", as herein used, is defined to be any person, association or
corporation engaged in the performance of any work
for another, who while so engaged, is independent
of the employer in all that pertains to the execution of the work, is not subject to the rule or control
of the employer, is engaged only in the performance
of a definite job or piece of work and is subordinate to the employer only in effecting a result in
accordance with the employees design."
Section 35-1-62, U.C.A. 1953 provides in part:
"When any injury or death for which c ompensation
is payable under this title shall have been caused
by the wrongful act or neglect of another person
not in the same employment, the injured employee,
or in case of death his dependents, may claim compensation and the injured employee or his heirs or personal
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

representative may also have an action for
damages against such third persons... I*(Under- ^
scoring added)
By the interpretation placed on these two sections
this court has recently denied a number of third party
suits involving subcontractors and their employees in actions
brought against either the general contractor or other subcontractors.

The theory behind these cases seems to be

that "the same employment" includes general contractors#
sub-contractors and employees of sub-contractors. Smith v.
Alfred Brown Co. 27 U 2d 155, 493 P 2d 994., Gallegos v.
Stringham, 21 U 2d 139, 442 P 2d 31,- Doyle v. Facilities,
Inc., 29 U 2d 41, 504 P 2d 1006.
If section 35-1-42, supra, were paraphrased, it
could be phrased as follows:

Where any employer (Young)

procures any work to be done (hauling trailers) by a
contractor (Ashton) over whose work he (Young) retains
supervision or control and such work is a part or process
in the trade or business (transporting trailers) of the
employer (Young) such contractor (jtshton) shall be deemed
an employee of such original employer (Young).
The only elements necessary to establish the above
relationship is to demonstrate that the employer has
retained some supervision or control over the sub-contractor and that they are both engaged in the same trade or
business.

The record is full of instances of control

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and supervision by Young.

Such control is absolutely

essential for the orderly operation of Young's business.
It is likewise clear that Young1s business was the same
as Ashton - ie the transportation of trailers from place
to place.
In Smith v Alfred Brown Co., supra, this court found
that masonry work was apart or process of the trade
or business of a building contractor, thus making masonry
subcontractors1 employee an employee of the general contractor under this section.

It would appear logical that

the sub-contractor himself is also an employee.
This situation is identical with the case at bar.
Ashton as the sub-contractor under Young is in the same
employment as Young.

Plaintiff would not seriously

contend that Ashton is so independent of Young that Ashton
could sue Young as a third party tort claimant.

If Young

could not be held responsible as a negligent third party,
then Ashton must be treated as being in the same employment as Young and, therefore, an employee.
Referring to the first part of Section 35-1-42,
supra, it may be significant to cover the necessary elements
to establish the relationship. There is no question but
what Young is "an employer". Young in fact "procurred
work to be done" by Ashton.

The transportation of trailers

is, in fact,"a part or process of the trade or business" of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Young.

Young did in fact retain some "supervision or

control" over the activities of Ashton*

It necessarily

follows that Ashton himself and "all persons employed by"
Ashton and "all other sub-contractors under" Ashton
are, in fact, statutory employees of Young.
The next sentence of Section 35-1-42, supra, defines
what an independent contractor is. Please note the language "independent of the employer in all that pertains
to the execution of the work."

(Underscoring added).

The additional language "is engaged only in the performance
of a definite job or piece of work".

The relationship

between Young and Ashton was an ongoing thing not limited
to one job or piece of work.

And finally, "is subordin-

ate to the employer only in effecting a result in accordance with the employers design."

Even if the facts can

be extended to this standard on behalf of Young, Young
can still be held to be a statutory employer - if any
right of supervision, direction or control is present.
CONCLUSION
The Industrial Commission's Findings of Pact should
be affirmed and the Order issued thereon should be sustained
that Ashton was either an employee of Young or as an
independent contractor was a statutory employee of Young
and as such is entitled to workmens compensation.
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Respectfully submitted this

N^day of May, 1975.

VERNON B. ROMNEY, Attorney General
State of Utah
Attorney for I n d u s t r i a l Coiranission
S t a t e C a p i t o l Building
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84114
and
ROBERT J. SHAUGHNESSY, Attorney for
Dennis Ashton,
543 East 5th South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorneys for Defendants
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